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Spinoza and Virtue: The significance of habituation to a virtuous character
to the ethics of the Ethics
By bobbie sue schindler
Faculty Mentor: Dr. Angela Coventry

Introduction
Although scholars disagree on the specific kind of ethical theory in Spinoza’s work, they agree that
there is a connection between certain types of knowledge and one’s ability to live the good life. 1
Specifically, it is in how one is to move toward control of their emotions that the connection
between knowledge and ethics, or the good life, becomes clear. The connection is made by
understanding that, dependent on what type of knowledge one is operating on, one can move
closer, or further away, from control of their emotions and a human perfection where the good life
is to be achieved. Spinoza’s method to achieve control over one’s emotions, much like the modern
practice of psychotherapy, asserts that through knowledge of one’s own emotions coupled with
knowledge of the world one finds herself in, one can move toward a self-determined character
where one acts and does not react. Becoming purely active and self-determined occurs by the
development of virtuous states of character in a movement through Spinoza’s hierarchy of
knowledge where one obtains the highest form of knowledge: intuitive knowledge. In a state of
pure activity based on intuitive knowledge, one becomes the free person and lives with a sense of
eternal blessedness, a non-transitory joy. In this state, human perfection and the good life are to
be found.
Achieving Spinoza’s perfected human state of eternal blessedness, or becoming the free person, is
a challenging and uncommon thing to achieve. 2 Though Spinoza is famously explicit in saying the
model is ‘difficult and rare’ to achieve, it still is an achievable goal and not merely an optimal
ethical placeholder (5P42S). 3 While Spinoza claims that becoming the free person is a rare but
achievable goal, he also seems to claim that it is one achievable by anyone who sets themselves
toward it: “The greatest good of those who seek virtue is common to all, and can be enjoyed by all
1

This is seen in the disparate interpretations in Aloni (2008), Curley (1973), Garrett (1996) and Rosenthal (2001)., Curley
likens Spinoza's system to a sort of deontology (although he uses the term hortatory ethic) and Garrett makes the claim
that his work can align with a sort of deontology, consequentialism, emotivism and virtue ethics. Others see that Spinoza's
work belongs to virtue ethics (Rosenthal) or a eudaimonistic ethical theory (Aloni). To note: this work is inspired by my own
reading of Spinoza as a type of virtue ethicist, and this work is part and parcel to understanding that interpretation.
22
To note: ‘Eternal Blessedness’ and the ‘free person’ are connected, in my opinion, but not synonymous as this sentence
may seem to make them. The sense of blessedness one achieves comes by way of the intellectual love of God that arises
from acting by intuitive knowledge, which is virtue itself (5P42). The intellectual love of God, which arises from intuitive
knowledge is eternal (5P33) and blessedness consists of the mind’s perfection (5P33S), thus implying that one who has this
eternal blessedness has achieved a perfected mind and would model the ideal free person who operates via intuitive
knowledge. Spinoza does state that ‘blessedness’ is something that one can enjoy the more one uses intuitive knowledge,
thus implying that it is not necessarily something constant (5P42). Although he states earlier: “From this we clearly
understand wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists, namely, in a constant and eternal love of God…”
(5P36S), which contestably requires one's intellectual love of God to be something constant, but more importantly this
statement aligns one’s freedom with one’s salvation and/or blessedness. If one where to achieve this difficult ‘salvation’,
being free from control of the emotions and feel a constant intellectual love of God, as I understand what salvation would
consist in for Spinoza (by 5P36S), then this would entail becoming the free person. Spinoza, in 5P42, never explicitly states
that free person is the one who has eternal blessedness, however I believe it can be adequately inferred, as the free person
is the ideal who acts from intuitive knowledge naturally and constantly, as opposed to the person of reason who must ‘work’
to be free, or experience a sort of freedom. This distinction between the person of reason and the free, or intuitive, person
is more clearly dealt with later in the paper.
3
Herman DeDijn promotes this position, claiming that without importance being put on intuitive knowledge, and without the
realization of the free person, the Ethics cannot be fully realized. Further, stating that without [becoming] the free person
who uses intuitive knowledge that one is stuck with the sorrows of reason. “Indeed, victory over the passions seems to
require a development in our knowledge that goes beyond the sort of knowledge of the rational man talked about in Ethics
IV.” (p. 39).
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equally.” (4P36). The greatest good is found in a knowledge of God that drives one’s activity, leads
one to become the free person, and to experience eternal blessedness (5P25, 5P42). This example
illustrates a tension of the Ethics: the greatest good is to be found by all who seek this virtue in the
proper manner, but only a few who seek this virtue in the proper manner will achieve the greatest
good. However, after careful examination there is no tension to be found, as I will show, because
Spinoza transitions from what he terms the ‘greatest good’ regarding knowledge from reason, in
Part Four, to intuitive knowledge, in Part Five. In this change of what underlies the greatest good
Spinoza seems to split his Ethics, or ways in which one is ethical through her use of virtue, into two
parts. One, in which the ethical behavior only occurs by means of a sort of struggle and a practice
to make that struggle, one’s bondage to the emotions, easier to navigate, which thus increases
one’s happiness over sadness. In the second part, ethical behavior, or virtue, simply exists and is
produced naturally or seemingly effortlessly, as is seen in the free person, who is in a constant
state of joy.
The problem addressed in this work is how one can become the free person who only, or primarily,
lives by intuitive knowledge. I argue that it is so near impossible or that so few could obtain having
a perfected intuitive knowledge that in advocating one’s ability to achieve this ideal Spinoza creates
a model of ethical behavior that is far outside his audience’s reach. Further, focusing on this goal of
the Ethics, or in seeing that the ethics of Ethics is only fully realized through becoming the free
person, diminishes the value of the pragmatic ethics found in habituation to the virtuous states of
character of tenacity and nobility. 4 The goal of this work is to highlight that Spinoza’s conception of
the free person should be seen as a guide in one’s virtuous activity, and that the genuine realizable
good life is to be found in the person of reason’s development and practice of tenacity and
nobility. 5 Thus, habituations to certain states of character are of prime importance to the ethics of
the Ethics.
To defend my thesis I first provide a glimpse of Spinoza’s Ethics and what concepts or propositions
form the foundation of this discussion. Next, I will discuss the link between the types of behavior
one produces, how free, or self-determined, a person is, with Spinoza’s types (or account) of
6
knowledge. After understanding these positions or relations, and what constitutes them, through
Spinoza’s propositions, I will discuss the problem of achieving a perfected intuitive state, or
becoming the free person, as well as the aforementioned tension of Spinoza seeming to claim that
the virtuous state of the free person is something that can be common, or achievable, to all who
set themselves toward it. Part of the goal of this work is to illustrate why it is that a fully realized
intuitive ‘state’ is difficult to obtain, thus making it only achievable for the rare few and not the
many, as one would hope an ethical model would be set to accomplish. Another, goal of this work
is to highlight the importance of habituation to Spinoza’s system and to illustrate that the ethics of
the Ethics need not be realized in the end goal of the free person, but in the process of working
toward that goal by use of reason. What is important in realizing the ethics of the Ethics is to use
reason to habituate and then practice certain states of character.

4
The pragmatic goal, as mentioned earlier, is in the sort of psychotherapy that occurs as a part of practice of habituation to
tenacity and nobility. While many scholars have illustrated Spinoza’s connection to the modern practice of
psychology/psychotherapy, such as Curley (1988), De Dijn (2004) and Jarrett (2007), there are also those who practice and
promote it such as Dr. Donald Robertson (2009). In addition to psychotherapy, there are those who see the contemporary
benefit in Spinoza’s ethics, such as Aloni. His paper sets out to show how conceptions from Spinoza’s eudaimonistic ethical
system can create the foundation for an “empowering and liberating pedagogy”.
5
Certainly, for Spinoza, the good life is to be found in the person of reason as well as the free person. However, what will be
shown later is that the good life that the person of reason experiences is only a modicum of what would be experienced by
the free person and that ‘true virtue’ can only exist in the free person.
6
This idea developed by reading Garrett, “…certain kinds of behavior become more prevalent as one becomes more freethat is, they vary proportionately with freedom. They do so because they are products of human virtue and the use of
reason, each of which renders us relatively more free, more able to act from our own nature rather than be determined by
external causes.” Added emphasis. (Garrett, 1996, p. 289)
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Casual Determinism and Virtue
Spinoza defines virtue in the Fourth Part of the Ethics 7 in the following:
“By virtue and power I understand the same things, that is (by 3P7), virtue, insofar as it is related
to man, is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he has the power to bring about certain
things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone.” (4D8)
At first glance this definition of virtue leaves something to be desired. Acting by one’s own nature
seems to be the sort of thing people naturally have the power and inclination to do, given a free
will. For Spinoza, there is no such freedom and like many of his terms one must understand this
conception of virtue within the context of his philosophical system. Specifically, one must
understand virtue within his account of causal determinism and our human bondage to fortune and
the emotions.
In part one of the Ethics, one learns what Garrett calls a central feature of nature for Spinoza,
which is the relationship between Nature (God) 8 and all individual things, or the division between
substance and modes: “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.”
(1P15) (Garrett, 1996, pg. 270). The implications of this are that people have a direct and intimate
relationship not only with Nature, but also with all things that exist in Nature. This relationship
means that one’s actions can be conceived as being an expression of Nature, but also that one can
have a direct natural way of participating in the divine. From one’s intimate link to Nature comes
Spinoza’s necessitarianism, which claims everything that has occurred since the very first cause,
Nature, has unfolded in a determined manner and those things as they are, or have been, could
not have occurred in any other way (1P29). This view is the basis for Spinoza’s causal determinism.
To be free is to be the sole cause of one’s actions or existence and by this only Nature can be truly
free (1D7), as Nature is the first and continuing cause of everything. People, as with all other
things, are not free, or do not have a free will, and every person’s mind is determined by prior
causes (2P48). As he rejected the Cartesian idea of an infinite free will, he also rejected Descartes’
mind-body dualism. Spinoza parallels modes of thought to modes of extension, which entails the
anti-dualist conception of the identity of the mind to the body (2P7S). This move by Spinoza also
naturalizes a person’s affects (emotions) by making their occurrence identical to corresponding
states of the body. This naturalization of one’s emotions is important to note as one will find that
emotions will have a direct bearing on the ability, or inability, to be active in the world or to be free.
It is in this active movement to be free that one will find Spinoza’s concept of virtue.
One’s ability to experience some sort of freedom, or to act over being passive, relates to
adequate/inadequate ideas and adequate/inadequate causation. Adequate ideas are defined as an
idea that excludes external things in its understanding and has a clear and true understanding of
its object in itself (2D4). Inadequate ideas are those that are confused or not fully and clearly
known. Passions, or passive emotions, rely on confused or inadequate ideas, in which one does not
fully understand why she feels the way she does or why she is ‘acting’ a certain way. One can only
be said to be active, or the author of one’s actions, when they use adequate ideas (3P3). One must
understand adequate/inadequate causation through the essential piece of Spinoza’s Ethics, the
conatus. The conatus is simply each singular thing’s striving to persevere in their being (3P6) and
this striving is the essence of each individual thing (3P7). A thing can only be active when it is the
adequate cause of effects using, or through, its own nature when it clearly and distinctly
understands the effects. Further, it is passive when it is the inadequate, or partial, cause of effects
of things through its own nature (3D2). In addition, being active is in direct relation to furthering
I use the Curley’s (1994) translation of the Ethics.
God and Nature are synonymous for Spinoza; as God is simply the first cause, and complete eternal infinite totality and
creation of, Nature. I will use Nature in this essay over God.
7

8

3

one’s own perseverance, conatus, whereas in being passive one cannot further their perseverance.
When a person is aware of their striving, in mind and body, and moves toward specific things that
will aid in promoting, or furthering, her striving, this awareness is known as the affect (emotion) of
desire. Other affects that directly relate to the promotion, or hindrance, of one’s striving are joy
and sadness and their derivative emotions. Joy and sadness are defined as those things that
increase (joy) or decrease (sadness) one’s activity and/or capacity for perfection (3P11S). 9 It is
important to note that there are varying degrees and types of joy and sadness, but that of all the
emotions one may experience can be related to joy, sadness, or desire. In turn these can be
related to one’s activity or passivity.
A person’s activity or passivity comes down to her relationship to external causation. External
causes can be understood as those things that compel or constrain one’s actions in this or that way.
They are essentially anything of which an individual cannot be said to be the adequate cause, or
author. One can see it as fortune (or luck/happenstance), as in other people’s actions or perhaps
the events from a natural disaster. External causes also are the passions, which when not
understood, go unchecked and lead one passively to act rather than acting from knowledge of the
cause and oneself as the cause. These external causes, whether they are fortune or passions, are
always looming. One’s conatus (or striving) can, and will be, always subject to the force of the
external causes (4P3). While clearly one cannot have control over other people or the events of
Nature’s unfolding, it seems that they can have control over their emotions and their actions from
these events. Both the Stoics and Descartes thought that people could have absolute control over
the passions 10, but Spinoza claims one is always subject to them—one can only do their best to
‘accommodate’ oneself to them (4P4C). It is in this idea where one finds his account of human
bondage to external causation as expressed in one’s bondage to the passions.
It is important to notice the intimate relationship between virtue and the conatus, as virtue is
nothing other than acting by the laws of one’s own nature (self-determination) and one’s striving to
preserve in her being (conatus) can only be furthered by the laws of one’s own nature. Spinoza
states that the conatus, or one’s striving, is the first and only foundation of virtue and that without
it one could not conceive of virtue, or virtuous activity (4P22C). It is in the ability to use one’s
power, or virtue, that one finds the cause of her happiness. When one considers her power of
acting she feel joy, or some variation of it, and feels this joy the more she imagines her power of
acting, and/or being praised (3P53, P53C). One should remember that the happiness one feels
from her power of acting is not just in the action itself, but in what was necessary for it to occur.
Namely, this happiness is in one’s knowledge of the necessity of all causes relating back to, and
being a part of, the first cause Nature. When one thinks about the awesomeness of the totality of
the Universe, and oneself within it, actively [self-] determining new causal chains, a person feels a
certain type of joy. In this one can see how it is that Spinoza claims we do not need anything else
to cause the desire to be virtuous in his sense of the term: “…we ought to want virtue for its own
sake, and that there is not anything preferable to it.” (4P18S)
The requirements for virtue are in understanding one’s determined nature, one’s bondage to
external causation and obtaining adequate knowledge. Acting from virtue is nothing other than
participating in a certain way of living by the guidance of reason 11 from the basis of seeking one’s
own advantage (4P24). In this one must understand the mind as the proximate cause, or that the
9
When discussing the emotions the terms affects and passions are used by Spinoza and I tend to use all three: affects,
passions and emotions. However, it should be noted that an affect can be understood as an active emotion-one that is
clearly, or adequately known, and can be related to a person’s activity, or being free. Whereas, a passion is understood as a
passive emotion, where one doesn’t know its cause clearly and is passive to the ‘pull’ or force of the emotion.
10
Spinoza notes this in 5Pref, “…the Stoics thought that they depend entirely on our will, and that we can command them
absolutely” and referring to Descartes’ position, “…since the determination of the will depends only on our power, we shall
acquire an absolute dominion over our passions, if we determine our will by firm and certain judgments…”
11
The guidance of reason will be further explained in the next section through the prescriptions of reason.
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thing and/or effect must be understood by one’s mind clearly and distinctly to be an action, or
exercise of virtue (4P23). If not, one is acting passively. This conception of virtue promotes and
insists upon knowledge and understanding as a basis to move toward a way of living that promotes
the flourishing of the individual and community alike. This can be seen in what Spinoza claims
reason strives the most for, understanding (applied knowledge), as it is the most useful thing to
reason (4P26). One cannot act without understanding (3P3). Understanding promotes acting
toward one’s advantage, or one’s striving, and this is virtue itself. Thus, understanding becomes
the foundation for virtue (4P26). The greatest knowledge, or understanding, we can have is
knowledge of Nature. It is natural that knowledge of Nature is the greatest good as Nature contains
everything and everything true, 12 so one’s greatest virtue is to understand Nature (4p27). For
Spinoza, this greatest good is not something lofty of which few can have understanding, but is
something that can be enjoyed by all people (4P36). The more that a person comes to understand
Nature and seek out virtue the more virtuous she becomes and the more it is that she wants to
share this joy with others (4P20, 4P37). It is in one’s, “...desire to do good 13 generated in us by our
living according to the guidance of reason, I call morality.”(4P37S)
Thus far his account of virtue seems solely egoist, and largely it is. However, Spinoza claims it is
ridiculous to think that a person could move to a greater perfection on her own. The individual
mind alone does not, and will not, provide one with all that she needs to survive and thrive. All
individuals need other things and people to do this. In one’s seeking to thrive, or flourish, reason
dictates that one seek out those things which agree with one’s nature, or are not contrary to it, to
aid in promoting one’s advantage. What is most useful to people are other people and specifically
other people who use reason (4P18S, 4P35). What would be ideal, considering this, is that all
people agreed in natures, or were rational, so that all could join together, to form one whole, which
worked toward a common advantage. 14
It has been established that people exist as singular things in an infinite chain of causation bound
by external causation to act in determinate ways and one must work to understand how it is that
she can experience some sort of freedom via her virtuous activity. Spinoza seems to offer two
avenues for one to move toward experiencing this freedom, and hopefully a perfected human state
where this sense of freedom is constant. The first, is in the prescriptions of reason (4P18S), in
which one is guided through reason’s demands so that she may increase her power of acting
through understanding some guiding precepts. The second, and intimately linked to the first, is in
the power of the mind over the affects (5p10S, 20S), where methods of habituation that utilize
reason’s precepts are given. Specifically, through knowledge of oneself, and through habituation to
ways of thinking or ordering one’s thoughts, a person can moderate the emotions and their power
over them. Both of these methods to virtue, or freedom, look to the model of the free person as a
height of human excellence and use the two strengths of character, tenacity and nobility toward
this goal. In the next section, I will explain, through the three types of knowledge and the
behaviors or actions that occur by their use, tenacity and nobility and their application in moving
toward becoming the free person.

Three types of knowledge and virtuous actions

If one knows, or has, some knowledge of Nature, then that would constitute an adequate or true idea.
Good is defined in 4D1, “By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful to us.” But good (and evil) is also
understood more clearly in 4P27, “We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, except what really leads to understanding
or what can prevent us from understanding.” In this one can see our desire to do good in our aiding others in their striving
through understanding (knowledge), or in our friendship creating joy which aids them in being active toward understanding.
14 This ideal is more completely treated in the Theological Political Treatise relating to the ideal state, a perfected
democracy.
12
13
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In understanding the three types of knowledge in Spinoza’s hierarchy it is important to note a
difference between understanding the definitional sense of the types of knowledge and the
behaviors that are produced as a result. In the proceeding I will first briefly explain the definitions
of the three types of knowledge, then move to a discussion of their relation to virtuous activity. 15
First in this hierarchy, and the only cause of falsity, inadequate or confused ideas, is opinion or
imagination, which is based on such things as reading, remembering, and forming ideas of things
from random experience. The second type is reason, which is based on an understanding of the
common properties of things. Knowledge connected to reason can be found in principles in
common in mathematics, or universal notions (2P40S1), but generally reason is certain ideas that
are common to all people (2P38C). It is in understanding the general properties of things that one
can move to knowledge of the specifics that fallout from the body of common knowledge.
Knowledge of specifics occurs when one has amassed a large body of adequate knowledge based
on reason and can deduce adequate knowledge about singular things from the universals found in
reason (2P47S). Knowledge of the specifics is unique to the third type, intuitive knowledge, which
“...proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the
adequate knowledge of the [NS: formal] essence of things.” (2P40S2) 16 Intuitive knowledge
consists in having a certain body of adequate knowledge (ideas) of Nature (the universe and its
workings) so that one can naturally infer, or intuit, other adequate ideas about the properties
(essences) of related things. Moreover, by understanding the essences, or specifics, of things as
they pertain to Nature, knowledge of what will follow from those things becomes clear, so that one
can operate from knowledge of the cause, starting with Nature and Nature’s attributes, to
knowledge of the effect. In this way one’s knowledge as a finite mode can resemble the intellect of
Nature, or the causal structure of Nature’s intellect (Garrett, 2010, Pg. 113-114).
Most people operate by the first type of knowledge, or have a tendency to fall into the types of
behavior associated with the first type of knowledge. According to Spinoza, the first kind of
knowledge leads to a slew of problems based upon on inadequate ideas, such as superstition, false
religious understandings, sadness and passivity. This type of knowledge is based solely on what
one perceives either through hearing, reading or seeing, but the investigation ends at perception.
When one operates this way one merely takes things at face value, assuming largely that ‘that is
just the way it is’ or ‘that luck made things occur this way’, not realizing that there is a cause for
the way things are nor seeing things as necessitated by the cause, as in the case of adequate
knowledge. Due to ignorance, or inadequate ideas, the person is necessarily passive to the world.
She awaits happenstance and does not pursue a deeper understanding of Nature or herself (her
emotions). Things simply are because that is the way they are, or things are true because she,
without further investigation, takes things told, taught or read to be true. In this one does not
reflect upon things or events with reason; one makes uninformed decisions or judgments, behaves
and reacts without thinking, and often defaults to superstitions and assumptions for answers or
comfort. An example may be that one is often angry, depressed and irritable and she simply
assumes this is her given disposition: “well, this is just the way I am and I can’t change”. Yet, if
one reflected upon this through reason she may be apt to find the cause of her disposition, such as
in a physiological disorder (chemical imbalance or thyroid problem) or perhaps understanding
certain things to be ‘triggers’ for their behavior. If the latter, by use of reason through
understanding the cause of their anger one can separate the idea of the external cause of their
15

Providing an adequate picture of Spinoza’s account, or hierarchy, of knowledge is a formidable task, one I will not tackle
here. It will be my task to explain as much as is needed to satisfy a sketch of an understanding for the purposes of the
discussion here. For more on this topic look to: Garrett (2010), Steinberg (2009), Wilson (1996).
16
Diane Steinberg in “Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics” points to the fact that there is some scholarly disagreement whether
or not intuitive knowledge is based solely on knowledge of ‘particulars’. (Steinberg, Pg. 154) Further, Garrett claims that
while universals, or common things, are related to reason and particulars to intuitive knowledge that intuitive knowledge is
not limited by, or to, knowledge of particulars (Garrett, 2010, Pg. 110). Lastly, Curley in Behind the Geometrical Method
claims that intuitive knowledge, or knowledge of God, should be broadly understood as scientific knowledge (Curley, Pg.
125). This should show enough how difficult it is to adequately understand Spinoza’s concept of intuitive knowledge.
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anger to first reduce the passion, then work to avoid or rid oneself of that particular external
trigger. 17 However, if a person only operated by this first type of knowledge no such ‘work’ or
‘therapy’ would occur to the individual.
Reason, by definition, 18 operates in how one can see things generally as related to one another, as
a part of the larger scheme of Nature, and make practical inferential assumptions and actions
based upon this relation. 19 However, what defines the person of reason, or rational person, is her
actions amidst the struggle against external causation and/or the passions. In contrast to the
person who operates by the first type of knowledge, the rational person seeks to understand the
causes of the effects that she experiences in the world. In seeking to understand these causes, one
gains knowledge, which allows her to make relational inferences about things in Nature, including
one’s own and other’s behavior. It is not simply the relation between things or events in Nature,
but the relation of those things that are viewed as good or bad in relation to one promoting her
striving and/or freedom (De Dijn, pg.47). One necessarily forms notions of good and bad
corresponding to how something will move her toward, or away from, the ideal free person, which
one also necessarily forms in their struggle against external causes (4Pref.). The free person is the
ideal one wants herself to become, a model of a perfected human nature, guided by an
understanding of Nature and oneself within Nature.
It is in the rational person’s desire to become the ideal that the use of the fictions of good and bad
come into play through the prescriptions of reason. The rational person is at the mercy of external
causation and/or the passions, yet she has her own precepts of reason to aid her through reflection,
or use of the imagination (5P10S). The prescriptions of reason state that reason demands that one
loves herself, seeks out what useful things will promote her obtaining a greater perfection and that
one strives to persevere in their being, or seek one’s own advantage, as much as one can (in this)
(4P18S). With the understanding that good and evil are not intrinsic to objects or events (4Pref.),
but rather to how one is affected either with some variation of joy or sadness (passage to a greater
or lesser perfection 3P11S), coupled with the awareness that these affects are related to the
promotion or hindrance of one’s striving, or one’s understanding (4P27), can the moral implications
be seen. The activity of virtue occurs by use of one’s reason in which one acts in such a way that
promotes her own, or others’, advantage. This is displayed in Spinoza’s two central strengths of
character: tenacity and nobility (3P59S). Both of these strengths of character can be said to be the
foundation for all actions which occur insofar as one understands. Moreover, tenacity and nobility
can only be linked to one’s activity and not to passivity or partially authored actions. Due to
tenacity and nobility only being linked to understanding, or adequate ideas, a person cannot be
called virtuous who acts based upon the first type of knowledge. Tenacity is the sort of action one
does from the dictate of reason when promoting one’s own advantage. Spinoza gives the examples
of moderation, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger as virtuous actions relating to tenacity.
Nobility comes about as one strives from the dictate of reason to aid others and/or to join with
them in friendship, which can be seen in the given examples of courtesy and mercy.
5P10S states that, “So long as we are not torn by affects contrary to our nature, we have the
power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect.”
From this power one has to order and connect the affections of the body; one can also make it so
they are not easily affected by negative emotions. It is in this that one can see how the rational
person’s practice of tenacity and/or nobility comes into play. The person of reason, in not having a
perfect knowledge of her emotions, is to operate using certain rules or maxims relating to her own
striving, which will help guide her. Further, one should not only continually practice these in
17

This being an example of using propositions or components of Spinozistic therapy as explained in 5P20S (5P2, 5P4S,
5P10S).
18
By Spinoza’s earlier definition.
19
“Spinoza regards reason as a cognitive inferential process by which adequate knowledge is derived from other adequate
knowledge.” (Garrett, 1996, pg. 295)
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specific events in one’s life, but also imagine events which may occur so that when they do, or
something similar, she will be prepared to deal with them in the best way possible, or in the most
virtuous manner. Spinoza gives us the example of the maxim of life that hate is to be conquered by
love, or nobility (4P46). So, the rational person is to think of the common wrongs that people do
and think how one would respond with nobility in mind then one is more apt to be virtuous when
these occurrences appear. Jarrett provides an example of how the rational person would respond to
feelings of anger due to being tailgated on the highway (Jarrett, pg.164-165). It perhaps is natural
to be angry and in these situations people often tend to respond negatively in ways that result in
“road rage” and/or accidents because they are responding purely based on a passive emotional
response. However, one can realize she is driving slowly and the better action is to move to the
right lane to allow the tailgater to pass. Also, she can remember the other drivers’ determined
nature and that this person could not have acted in any other way given his or her own set of
causes, what they were going through in the moment, and realize that it is counterproductive to
get upset about something so trivial (5P6). The rational person realizes this is a ridiculous thing to
be angry about and can move on feeling good that they avoided a potentially hazardous or
frustrating situation and is able to go about their day more joyously (5P10S). When a person
realizes one’s own advantage (conatus), the satisfaction of the mind by acting according to the
right way of living (4p52), the good that comes from mutual friendship and a ‘common society’,
and the necessity of Nature in people or events unfolding, then one will be more likely to overcome
her negative emotions related to certain ‘wrongs’. There are of course things which will be difficult
to overcome, but Spinoza claims that in one’s understanding of things this way, by the right ways
of living and understanding of necessity, that one will overcome these more quickly than if she
didn’t use reason to understand things in this way. Moreover, if one only relied on one’s emotions,
as does the person who operates by the first kind of knowledge, then perhaps she could never get
out of sadness, or variations of it.
So, whereas the person who only operates by the first type of knowledge simply takes events to
be as they are, or accepts effects without a desire to understand the causes, the rational person
using adequate knowledge and reflection will strive to understand why they feel, or are behaving, a
certain way. However, unlike the rational person, who has to work to understand their emotions
and rely on personal rules to ensure they act with tenacity and/or nobility, the intuitive person has
already established these things so firmly as to not need them. They simply act in the best way
possible, in a way that makes the decision seem instantaneous. The few propositions relating to
the free person in Part Four of the Ethics mean to illustrate the actions that would fall out from the
free person’s use of ingrained rationality, or established prescriptions of reason, and are not
inclusive to all virtues that would or could fall out from them. The examples given are: the free
person does not fear death, is valued in avoiding danger as in overcoming it, avoids the favors of
the ignorant, has earnest gratitude toward one another, and is always honest (4P67, P69, P70, P71,
P72). It is important to regard these in certain degrees rather than absolutes or drawing
conclusions that do not align with the point of the actions. 20 For example, the free person has no
fear of death because to fear is to engage in a type of sadness, a passion. The free person only
seeks to promote their advantage and does so naturally. So, it is not that she would welcome
death, or would not be upset if it came sooner than later, but that the free person would not waste
time worrying about something which is at the same time certain to happen, yet uncertain when
and how it will occur. That action of worrying, or dwelling in fear, would only hinder her striving
and simply would not occur in her. One can see this also with the example of always being honest.
It can be argued that there are times when a person may need to be dishonest to save one’s self,

20
The ‘point’ being what these propositions seek to illustrate much like a fable. In that they are to illustrate the ideal
perfected human that the rational person desires to become.
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to preserve in one’s being, and in doing so is choosing a lesser evil over a greater one, by the
dictate of reason, for a greater future good (4P65, P66). 21
What is perhaps most important to recognize about the free person, who operates via intuitive
knowledge, is that they are free from the struggle of the emotions. It is not that they do not have
emotions, but that they are not controlled by them. 22 In this they live a continually active selfdetermined life, fully knowing themselves, and taking every event or emotion to be another
opportunity to increase their activity of purely living in the moment. It is in this that some have
aligned the intuitive person with a sort of high level Buddhist meditative living. 23 Further, it is in
this state of pure activity that one can feel the greatest joy derived not only from one’s selfdetermination, as in the person of reason, but based on the intellectual love of Nature that can only
be truly felt through intuitive knowledge.
Commonly, when a person is called virtuous, it is said because that person has expressed some
action which aligns with what others would consider a good or right action which could be courage,
temperance, chasteness, frugality or justice to name a few. For these virtues to be exercised there
need not be a certain kind of knowledge which one employs to act with virtue, it is simply the
exercise itself which constitutes virtue. However, say by a classical Aristotelian account, a single
act of ‘virtue’, say courage, which is not supported by years of habituation to right action and
phronesis in the author, cannot be rightly called a virtuous action. The act of courage may perhaps
be called a good action and the first step toward developing a virtuous disposition, yet it is not
virtue itself. By an Aristotelian account it is after one has gained a character disposition ingrained
by years of habituation coupled by achieving phronesis that one can be said to have a virtuous
character, or to act virtuously. For Spinoza building a certain character is also of great importance;
however one need not have that character cemented before one can be called virtuous. For
example, the person of reason can be said to be virtuous, or to act virtuously, without having the
constant virtuous disposition that the model of the free person has. One’s being virtuous is
synonymous with the use of one’s power of self-determination. Thus, the more self-determined one
is, the more virtuous they can be said to be, and this self-determination rests on an understanding
of Nature, as has been explained. Certainly, there are more aspects of Aristotelian virtue one could
compare and contrast with Spinozistic virtue, but that would go outside the scope of this work.
What is important here is that virtue for Spinoza is something that anyone with reason and the
proper understanding of Nature can express. The person of opinion or imagination, who does not
understand Nature nor her own (determined) nature as a part of Nature’s causal structure, cannot
be said to be virtuous in any degree because she lacks the understanding, or use of understanding,
necessary to be said to act, or self-determine. Spinoza’s virtue is about self-determined action,
over passivity to the world, in an effort to maintain a constant joyous disposition based upon
knowledge and understanding, and to promote a harmonious rational society.

More on Knowledge and the Significance of Virtuous Character

21 This topic of honesty and the free person is more completely dealt with by Don Garrett in “A Free Man Always Acts
Honestly, not Deceptively”: Freedom and the Good in Spinoza’s Ethics”.
22
To note: 3D3, “…by affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or
diminished, aided or restrained…Therefore, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, I understand by the
affect and action; otherwise, a passion.” The free person, in having adequate knowledge of themselves and the world, is
able to be the adequate cause of ‘active’ affects, which further promotes her activity. As opposed to one whose knowledge is
inadequate and who is passive to her affects.
23
De Dijn in his work claims this, and his basis comes from Jay Wetlesen, “…‘lose’ ourselves in a meditative activity in which
our passions are not so much exterminated as functioning as occasions for further meditative thinking, with the active
emotions it involves.” (De Dijn, p. 50).
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From what has been said in the Ethics, up to Part Four, ‘knowledge of Nature’ pertains to reason
and intuitive knowledge (from 2P46 and 2P47S), 24 however what Spinoza is primarily concerned
with until Part Five of the Ethics is the second type of knowledge: reason. He is concerned with
reason, and in 4P28 25 calls reason the mind’s greatest good because, by 2P47S, without having a
substantial amount of ingrained adequate knowledge from reason, a person cannot move toward
deducing specific things. It is in the ability to deduce specific things from an existing significant
body of universal knowledge that one comes to have intuitive knowledge. When Spinoza states that
“the greatest good of those who seek virtue is common to all, and can be enjoyed by all equally”
(4P36), he does not mean to entail that intuitive knowledge, or becoming the free person, is
something that can be common to all, but that reason, and acting by the guidance of one’s reason
can be enjoyed by all equally. From this, it should be clear that becoming the free person is not
something that Spinoza held could be achieved by anyone who set themselves to it, which at first
glance seems to be what he is claiming, but it is instead a difficult and rare thing to achieve, and
that the rare few who set themselves toward it will attain (5P42S).
In 5P25, Spinoza claims, “the greatest striving of the mind and its greatest virtue is understanding
things by the third kind of knowledge”, which seems to contradict 4P28 in that the greatest virtue
of one’s mind was to know Nature in respect to having adequate knowledge based on reason,
which would hopefully, if utilized properly, form into the third type of knowledge. So, where reason
had once been one’s greatest good, now it has shifted to intuitive knowledge. This seems to be due
to the desire to move people toward building an intellectual stronghold based upon reason before
moving on to forming intuitive knowledge. The switch of the mind’s greatest good in respect to
knowledge of Nature, from reason to intuitive knowledge, occurs because it is only by intuitive
knowledge that humans as finite modes can use their intellect in a manner which resembles
Nature’s intellect (Garrett, 2010, pg. 113-114). So, the more that a person who has established a
significant body of adequate universal knowledge deduces singular things from that body of
knowledge, the more it is that she will understand Nature (5P24). In this a person can be said to
know Nature more, or to be closer to Nature, and in this feel the greatest satisfaction at her ability
to ‘pass to a greater perfection’, to become the free person, and feel the deepest joy in this (by
5P27). In addition to becoming the free person and feeling the deepest joy, the free person
understands even more deeply than the person of reason of Nature as the cause, and feels a deep
intellectual love of Nature (by 5P32C). It is this intellectual love of Nature, accompanied by the joy
one feels as the free person, that is eternal blessedness and the great ‘reward’ of the Ethics
(5P36S). 26
However, as hinted earlier, the difference between the person of reason and the free person is that
the joy the free person feels (intellectual love of Nature) is greater and constant, or non-transitory.
Whereas the person of reason experiences a joy that is more or less fleeting, dependent upon how
close one is to the ideal in the free person. This separation is what concerns some, such as De Dijn,
who is concerned that without fully achieving the ideal one is stuck with the ‘sorrows of reason’,
where one knows the better, but cannot avoid the worse (De Dijn, pg.48). He suggests that one
cannot have any true success over the emotions by reason alone, nor fully achieve leading the

24

All ideas exist in Nature, as do all things, however to say one had knowledge of something in Nature, would mean they
understand it clearly and distinctly, or adequately. Thus, knowledge of Nature is exclusive to reason and intuitive
knowledge.
25
4P28, “Knowledge of God is the mind’s greatest good; its greatest virtue is to know God.”
26
While eternal blessedness is the highest goal one could achieve through a virtuous character, the doctrine of the eternality
of the mind, as a constitutive part of eternal blessedness, is not necessary for one to know to strive for virtue for Spinoza
(5P41). He claims it unnecessary in reaction to those who claim that without some divine reward or punishment after ones
death that people will not be able, or apt, to live their lives virtuously. Yet, Spinoza says that people do not need religion, or
some kind of eternality, to be virtuous persons in their daily lives — people instead need reason based on adequate
knowledge (5P41S).
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good life, unless one achieves becoming the free person. 27 The concern that the person of reason is
stuck with the ‘sorrows of reason’, or that she will never feel joy as deeply as the free person, is
easily dismissed when it is realized that a perfected human state is largely unobtainable. 28 As
mentioned, humans, as a part of Nature, will always be subject to Nature and the passions. 29 Even
De Dijn admits that the best one can hope for is that she minimizes the control of emotions so that
the emotions occupy the smallest part of one’s mind. (De Dijn, pg. 53). Events will occur of which
one can have no foresight or control, which will lead any person, “free” or otherwise, into passivity,
events in which one does not know the cause of the event or thing, and derives passive emotions
due to lack of understanding. What I claim is the best one can hope for in this quest for selfbetterment, or virtue, is to experience glimpses of the intuitive/free self, and the joys from reason,
more often than not so one is motivated to continue to move toward the ideal one desires to be, as
seen in the free person. Without the doctrine of eternal blessedness, or eternality of the mind, and
due to human bondage, it should be clear now why habituation to tenacity and nobility is most
important. These states will be what enable one to be apt to control their emotions and move one
to flourish, not only individually but also communally, in their everyday lives.

Conclusion
Through an understanding of Spinoza’s concepts of virtue, the prescriptions of reason, the virtuous
states of tenacity and nobility, and the free person, I hope to have made clear the complexity of
Spinoza’s concept of virtue, or one’s virtuous activity. Further, I hope I have highlighted the
problem of our determinism, or human bondage, as the cause for sadness and strife in individuals
and communities alike. Specifically, the cause is due to people tending not to think about the
causes of their feelings and actions, but instead to think they can control everything (even if they
may not explicitly think and/or say this) despite being controlled, or acted upon, themselves. This
leads to unfounded expectations and disagreements because people tend to think others are like
them, but are not, as each individual comes from their own series of causes. It is in one’s
realization of their own, and all things’, determined nature as being a part of Nature, that one can
start to reason and understand in certain ways that decreases one’s sadness, frustration, anger
and the like toward those things outside of oneself. Additionally, one can lessen those passive
emotions and/or passive behaviors by increasing their knowledge of Nature and knowledge of
oneself as a part of Nature, through knowing one’s own psychology, more what causes her to act in
certain ways, what brings about certain emotions, and how to use that knowledge to one’s
advantage. It is in this that one can move toward virtue, seeking what is best by their nature
(conatus) and avoiding what will hinder or harm it. What I have also shown is that it is in the
activity of pursuing one’s own advantages that one feels good, or happy, and does so the more one
understands Nature, because she can make more informed rational choices. Further, the more one
27

True virtue, or leading the perfected human ‘good life’, can only exist in the free person because the person of reason still
has a certain lack of power (4P37S1). They may act virtuously, and do so the more they habituate themselves to the
guidance of reason through acting with tenacity and nobility; however their use of virtue will always be less perfect than the
virtue that exists in the free person, simply by the means of which they must employ it. Therefore, the greatest virtue is to
be found in the free person whose virtuous activity is constant, and a lesser virtue to be found in the person of reason
whose virtuous activity waxes and wanes.
28
In addition to the point that becoming the free person is largely unachievable, in “Spinoza’s Ethical Theory”, Garrett,
states the free person is a model to set oneself to in one’s process of enhancing their existence, or working to lead an
ethical life, and that within the Ethics the perfectly free person would turn out inconsistent with Spinoza’s initial propositions
(Garrett, 1996, pg. 289).
29
3P59S- “From what has been said it is clear that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like
waves on the sea, driven by contrary winds, we toss about, not knowing our outcome and fate.”
4P4C- By 4P3 and 4P4, “From this it follows that man is necessarily always subject to passions, that he follows and obeys
the common order of Nature, and accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things requires.”
5Pref.- “Here, then, as I have said, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason, and shall show, above all, how
great its dominion over the affects is, and what kind of dominion it has for restraining and moderating them. For we have
already demonstrated above that it does not have an absolute dominion over them.”
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acts based on knowledge and feels joy from the action, the more one wants this virtue not only for
oneself, but for others as well. However, to be honest, the reason one wants this for others is so
they can get along with other people more easily (agree in natures) to benefit one’s own striving.
Still, this does still benefit the whole even if at its core it can be claimed solely egoistic.
By way of understanding the benefits that come from virtue, and its components, I have shown
they can be easily ‘taken away’ by external causation, or our human bondage to the passions.
When a person is feeling happiness in their striving along comes an event, person, or passion that
takes them off guard and sends them into some variation of sadness. Due to this one must
habituate oneself to a certain way of thinking to deal with these events in a way that best
promotes one’s striving. This way of thinking includes the aforementioned knowledge of Nature and
causal determinism, but it is more in understanding one’s emotions and reactions to events or
things in the world. After having understanding of one’s emotions and reactions one’s virtue is seen
in thinking about what would be the best action to aid oneself (tenacity) or another (nobility) in
their striving, or what could benefit both. Further, the value in this type of habituation (practice) is
supported by its use and study in psychotherapy.
Due to the difficulty in achieving a perfected intuitive knowledge and by being bound to the order
of Nature (4P4C), the ideal set to achieve in the free person who experiences eternal blessedness
is largely unachievable for most all people. Yet, Spinoza’s philosophy, or specifically virtue, is
meant to be one common and achievable by all (4P36). If one is to seek virtue, or a virtuous
manner of living from Spinoza’s work, that can be common to all, I claim we must defer to reason.
I have shown not only eternal blessedness regarding the eternality of the mind, which Spinoza
claims is unnecessary (5P41), but in the blessedness that follows from intuitive knowledge and the
intellectual love of Nature (5P36S), as unnecessary as well, as one can experience, to a lesser
degree, this same joy through reason. Through this it has been my task to show that the more
practical goal in obtaining virtue, or in realizing the ethics of the Ethics, comes from the joy one
feels in realizing her virtue, a type of blessedness, through reason, and by aiding others to realize
this joy as well in one’s daily life.
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